›› 2008, Vol. 10 ›› Issue (3): 116-119.

• 研究简报 • 上一篇    

农业产业化龙头企业与农户博弈实证分析

景为1,侯军岐2,刘录民1   


  1. (1.西北农林科技大学经管学院, 陕西 杨凌 |712100|2.北京信息科技大学, 北京 100085)
  • 收稿日期:2008-03-25 修回日期:2008-04-21 出版日期:2008-06-15 发布日期:2009-07-29
  • 通讯作者: 侯军岐,教授,博士性导师,主要从事农业技术经济与项目管理。E-mail: houjunqi@vip.sina.com
  • 作者简介:景为,博士研究生,主要研究方向为农业技术经济与项目管理。E-mail: weijing108@126.com。
  • 基金资助:

    北京市人文社科重点项目(SZ200711232019)资助。

An Empirical Analysis on the Game between Leading Agricultural
Industry Enterprises and Farm Households 


JING Wei1, HOU Jun-qi2, LIU Lu-min1   

  1. (1.College of Economics and Management, Northwest A &|F University, Shaanxi Yangling 712100; 2.Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100085, China)
  • Received:2008-03-25 Revised:2008-04-21 Online:2008-06-15 Published:2009-07-29

摘要:

在分析我国农业产业化中龙头企业与农户利益关系现状的基础上,分别建立了固定价格、违约金情况下和项目资金投入情况下的博弈模型,从中

发现增加违约金条款以及项目资金作为专用性投入可以有效地提高双方的违约成本,增强契约的稳定性,是完善双方关系的一条有效途径。

关键词: 业产业化;博弈模型;契约;稳定性

Abstract:

On the basis of analyzing the present status of benefit relation between leading agricultural industry enterprises and farm

households, this paper sets up game models under fixed price, insurance price arrangement condition and project capital input

condition respectively. From these models, the authors find that insurance price arrangement and project capital as asset

specific inputs can effectively increase the costs for disobeying contract by both sides, thus to buildup the contract

stability. This is an effective way to improve the relationship between both sides. 

Key words:  agricultural industrialization, game model, contract, stability

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